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Abstract
The effect of leadership decapitation—the capture or killing of the
leader of an armed group—on future violence has been studied
with competing conclusions. In Mexico, leadership decapitation has
been found to increase violence and in-fighting among drug cartels.
However, the causal pathways between leadership decapitation
and in-fighting are unclear. In this article, it is hypothesized that
leadership decapitation will weaken alliances between armed actors,
lead to greater preferential attachment in networks of cartels and
militias, and result in greater transitive closure as cartels seek to
expand their power. These hypotheses are tested with a stochastic
actor oriented model on a network dataset of episodes of infighting
among cartels and the militias formed to opposed them between
the five years before and after Joaquín, “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera,
the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, was arrested in 2016. The
results show that alliances have virtually no effect on the decision of
cartels and militias to fight each other; weaker organizations faced a
higher reputational cost after El Chapo’s detention; and post-arrest
cartel in-fighting did not increase as a result of uncertainty about the
relative balance of power among cartels.

Keywords
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This article examines how leadership decapitation
affects the decisions of drug cartels and militias to fight
each other. Previous work investigates how the arrest
or killing of a criminal or insurgent leader affects the
viability of the group being targeted and changes in
the level of violence (Atuesta and Ponce, 2017; Cronin,
2009; Johnston, 2012; Phillips, 2015; Price, 2012).
However, the effect of such operations on the infighting
network of criminal and vigilante organizations has not
received much attention. Addressing this gap, I model
the changes in the decision of drug cartels and militias
in Mexico to attack each other between the 5 years
before and after Joaquín, “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera,
the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, was arrested
in 2016. To do so, I create a new network dataset and
employ a stochastic actor oriented model. I find that
the effect of alliances on cartels’ and militias’ decisions
© 2021 Authors. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

to attack rivals changed little after El Chapo was
arrested; El Chapo’s arrest increased the reputational
cost to cartels and militias for appearing weak; and El
Chapo’s detention did not change uncertainty about
the balance of power among cartels. The rest of the
paper is organized around four sections. First, I review
the literature on leadership decapitation and derive
testable hypotheses. In the second section I outline the
research design. The third section presents the results,
and the final section is a discussion of and conclusions
from the results.

Leadership decapitation
Leadership decapitation is the capture or killing of
the leader or leaders of a criminal, terrorist, or insur
gent organization. The logic of pursuing a leadership
1
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decapitation strategy is that violent organizations will
not be able to function without their leader and violence
will decrease. While many studies have attempted to
estimate its effect on subsequent violence, the evi
dence is mixed. Pape (1996) argues that the unpre
dictability of leader succession in war makes it difficult
to pinpoint leadership decapitation as the cause of
a movements’ decline. Despite Pape’s skepticism,
some studies have found leadership decapitation to
be effective against terrorist organizations. Johnston
(2012) finds that counterinsurgents are more likely to
be successful if they capture or kill insurgent leaders
and Price (2012) reached a similar conclusion.
Other work does not claim that leadership de
capitation is either always or never effective at re
ducing violence but investigates under what conditions
it may work. A pioneering study by Jordan (2009)
found the success of a leadership decapitation strat
egy against terrorist groups to be dependent on the
groups’ age, size, and type. Similarly, Cronin (2009)
argues that leadership decapitation’s effectiveness
against a terrorist group is conditional upon the group’s
structure, whether it revolves around a charismatic
leader, the availability of a successor, the group’s
ideology, the political system in it exists, and whether
the leader is captured or killed. Likewise, Colby (2021)
argues that the effectiveness of leadership decapitation
is dependent upon how participatory the political
system is in which an insurgency exists, the credibility
of security forces, and whether or not the armed
group alienates civilians. Looking to Mexican cartels,
Phillips (2015) finds that leadership decapitation may
be effective in the short term, but violence increases in
the long term as cartels fragment and fight for territory.
Finally, Atuesta and Ponce (2017) find that major
security operations against Mexican cartels and their
resulting fragmentation led to more violence.
Following El Chapo’s arrest, Mexico experienced
an increase in cartel-related violence and the formation
of new cartels and militias (Ahmed, 2019; Ward, 2019);
however, there is little information on how the network
of these actors has changed between the periods
before and after El Chapo was arrested. With the
Sinaloa Cartel in decline, at least temporarily, one likely
outcome is that alliances between cartels break down
as former allies compete to fill the resulting power
vacuum.
Hypothesis 1: Following El Chapo’s arrest, the im
portance of alliances on cartels and militias’ decisions
to attack each other will decrease.
If alliances break down, smaller cartels that were
part of alliances should be less protected from violent
confrontation with rivals, eliciting a preferential attach
ment for future violence in general, but especially
2

from more aggressive cartels looking to consolidate
their power by attacking cartels already under attack.
Hypothesis 2: After El Chapo’s arrest, the
probability that a cartel or militia decides to attack
another organization will be greater for organizations
with higher levels of preferential attachment.
Hypothesis 2.1: After El Chapo’s arrest, the
probability that one cartel or militia attacks another
will be greater if the attacker is more aggressive and
the victim has already been under attack.
Furthermore, when El Chapo was in control of
the Sinaloa Cartel, there was certainty around its
strength, the territory it controlled, and who its allies
were. But El Chapo’s arrest might signify a weakening
of the cartel, leading to uncertainty around which
areas it controls and its power relative to other cartels.
This uncertainty could then spark more competition
among cartels to control a greater share of the drug
trade, resulting in greater transitive closure. For
example, one cartel might attack a second cartel, the
second cartel might attack a third cartel, and the third
cartel might attack the first cartel to establish who will
control a particular area.
Hypothesis 3: In the post-arrest period, higher
transitive closure will increase the probability of one
cartel deciding to attack another actor.
Before describing how I will examine changes to
in-fighting among Mexico’s cartels and militias, it is
worth mentioning that leadership decapitation is not
the only strategy a state may use to disrupt an illegal
network. According to Roberts and Everton (2011)
states can pursue a kinetic approach that targets
individuals and organizations directly or by increasing
allies’ capacity or a non-kinetic strategy to undermine
an organization’s influence and control. Unlike
leadership decapitation, kinetic strategies might seek
to neutralize the most central nodes, which may not
be leaders of a covert organization. States can also
target financial, social, or political networks rather
than members of the group (Carley, 2006). While
states may pursue any of these strategies in isolation
or alongside leadership decapitation, examining their
effect on in-fighting after El Chapo’s arrest is beyond
the scope of this article.

Methods
Stochastic actor oriented model
To model changes in the decisions of cartels and militias
of whether to engage in infighting between the five years
before and after El Chapo’s capture I employ a beforeand-after design. Effects are estimated via a stochastic
actor oriented model (SAOM), although it would also be
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possible to utilize relational event modeling (REM) or a
temporal exponential random graph model (TERGM).
However, while REM models may be interpreted in
an actor-oriented framework (Butts, 2017), they are
fundamentally tie-oriented (Stadtfeld et al., 2017).
Similarly, TERGMs treat ties as a function of previous
ties rather than actor choices (Block et al., 2017;
Snijders and Pickup, 2017). On the other hand, SAOMs
explicitly model actors’ choices with a rate function and
an objective function. The rate function determines
the probability that an actor can change a tie. In this
analysis, the rate function gives each actor an equal
probability of being able to change its tie at a given time
step. The optimization function is a linear combination
of covariates that nodes try to maximize given by
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where ski ( x ( ), x ) are network effects. SAOMs proceed
in mini steps where nodes are randomly selected by
the rate function to change a tie according to their
objective function (Snijders and Pickup, 2017).
To understand how El Chapo’s arrest changed the
way cartels and militias decide whether to attack each
other, I employ SAOMs to estimate the differences
in the mean relative importance in the five years
before and after El Chapo was captured. The relative
importance for a single network effect k on an actor i
derived from an estimated coefficient q̂ , as proposed
in (Indlekofer and Brandes, 2013), is given by
0
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where πi is the probability that actor i forms a tie with
the actor it was observed forming a tie with. Stated
differently, the relative importance of an effect k on an
actor i represents the change in i’s probability of forming
a tie with another actor j if effect k was excluded from
the model. The mean relative importance of an effect
k is the summation of the relative importance of k on all
actors divided by the number of actors. In this analysis,
the difference in the mean relative importance of an
effect represents the change in how much it contributed
to cartels’ and militias’ decisions to attack other
organizations after El Chapo was arrested compared to
before his arrest. It is important to note that this is not
the same as the regression coefficients of a SOAM.

Data
To create the network data, I collated event data from
the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan

et al., 2012), the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Geore
ferenced Events Dataset (Pettersson et al.,
2021; Sundberg and Melander, 2013), and the Armed
Conflict Location and Events Database (Raleigh et al.,
2010) that occurred between 2012 and 2021. Each
data source relies on news articles from a different set
of media outlets, so combining them ensures a greater
number of events are included in the final dataset and
at least partially eliminates the reporting bias that might
be present in any one dataset. Additionally, some
events in each dataset were coded as having unknown
actors but employing multiple datasets ensures that
at least some of the gaps in each dataset will be filled
in by the others. All datasets include events from
around the world and events where the state was the
perpetrator. In addition to lethal attacks, SCAD includes
riots strikes, and protests.
To isolate violent interactions between Mexican
cartels and militias, I excluded events that occurred
outside of Mexico; included a government actor; were
coded as a protest, riot, or strike; or occurred before
2012 or after 2021. The final dataset includes militias
because they were formed to protect communities
from cartel violence and may influence tie formation
between cartels. One might make the case that
transnational actors should also be included in my
analysis because they operate in Mexico and are
involved in the Mexican conflict. However, unlike
Mexican cartels, these groups are not heavily involved
in Mexican politics and do not attempt to gain material
support and sympathy from Mexican citizens, so their
role in Mexico’s drug war is tangential to the role of
Mexican actors. Finally, I merged events that had the
same attacker and victim and occurred on the same
day in the same municipality.
Ties between actors are directed and represent
at least one violent interaction from the sender to the
receiver. I created one network for interactions that
occurred between 2012 and 2016 and another for
2017 to 2021. To ensure an equal comparison, the
network in the pre-arrest period only contains ties
that were observed before El Chapo’s arrest and
the post-arrest network only contains ties that were
observed in the post-arrest period. Many militias and
sub-factions of larger cartels were not observed in
the pre-arrest network, so I code them as “joiners”
as per Ripley et al. (2021). The network in the prearrest period only contains 29 nodes and 19 edges
while the post-arrest network contains 132 nodes
and 124 edges, due to the formation of new subfactions and militias after El Chapo’s arrest. This does
not mean that edges only observed in one period
were not present in the other, but that they were
not observed in the other period. Figure 1 shows
3
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Figure 1: The network of in-fighting among cartels and militias in Mexico. The top panel is the
network of interactions among groups in the five years leading up to El Chapo’s arrest and the
right side shows interactions in the five years after El Chapo’s arrest. Nodes are colored
according to their structurally defined role and it is assumed that interactions that occurred
during before El Chapo’s detention persisted after he was arrested.

the two networks and Figure 2 displays their degree
distributions. Nodes in Figure 1 are colored according
to their structurally defined role. The majority of nodes
are small cartels and militias that control small swaths
of territory. The cartels in this role tend to specialize
in a small number of subtasks of drug trafficking and
align themselves with larger cartels. Unsurprisingly,
the most powerful cartels—the Gulf, Jalisco Nueva
Generacion, Los Zetas, and Sinaloa cartels—occupy
a unique role. Rising Challengers—Nueva Plaza,
Santa Rosa de Lima, Los Caballeros Templarios, and
La Nueva Familia cartels—are relatively new cartels
that are rapidly growing while the White Dwarfs—
Juarez and Beltran Leyva cartels—represent cartels
that are on the decline.
I include four independent variables that allow
for the testing of the hypotheses above. Out-degree
4

Jaccard similarity is the Jaccard similarity of outdegree ties between a node and every other node
in the network. A high Jaccard similarity between
the out-degree of two actors means that they both
fight similar other actors, which would indicate an
alliance. To account for preferential attachment, I
include the in-degree popularity metric. If preferential
attachment exists, this metric will be higher, indicating
that attacks against a cartel or militia beget future
attacks against the same cartel or militia. The out-indegree assortativity effect is similar, but it quantifies
the propensity for actors with high in-degrees to
attract ties from actors with high out-degrees. Put
differently, it indicates stronger cartels and militias
preying on weaker groups. The final effect, transitive
closure, is an approximate measure of clustering,
which suggests increased competition among cartels
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Figure 2: Degree distribution of in-fighting networks before and after El Chapo’s arrest. The plots
on the left show degree distribution of the in-fighting network before El Chapo was arrested and
the right side is after. The top portion displays in-degree distribution while the bottom shows
out-degree. Ties from the pre-arrest period are assumed to persist in the post-arrest period.

due to uncertainty about the balance of power after
El Chapo’s arrest.
In addition to these variables, I include five control
variables. Reciprocity accounts for the proportion of
a group’s outgoing ties that correspond to incoming
ties from the same node that the outgoing ties are
sent to. I also control for homophily related to four
node-level attributes. Aggression is the log of the
number of attacks conducted by each actor during
both periods. The subfaction attribute codes whether
an organization is a subfaction of a larger group or
independent. Militia is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if an organization is a militia and 0 if an
organization is a cartel. The role variable assigns each
organization to one of seven previously described
roles as determined by each group’s structural
equivalence with other organizations. More details on
how structural equivalence groups were created is
available in Appendix A.

Results
I estimate four SAOMs that correspond to the three
main hypotheses. In the first model I estimate the
impact of alliance formation and maintenance on
the decisions of actors to attack one another by
including a term for out-degree Jaccard similarity, or

the proportion of common out-degree ties versus all
out-degree ties of node pairs. In the second model, I
include a term for indegree popularity, or the sum of
the in-degree ties of all of a node’s neighbors, which
is an indicator of preferential attachment. The third
model includes a term for assortativity of outdegree
ties to nodes with higher in-degrees, which indicates
more aggressive organizations preferentially attack
cartels and militias that are already under attack. The
final model incorporates a term for transitive closure
that corresponds to clustering, in line with Feld’s
(1981) theory, indicates tie formation around a shared
focus, which in this case is drug trafficking. All the
models include controls for reciprocity and homophily
among the four node-level attributes. Table 1 above
shows the raw coefficients for these results before
they are transformed to changes in mean relative
importance.

Alliance degradation
Figure 3 shows the results of the first model. Out-degree
Jaccard similarity is marginally positive (estimates are
rounded to two decimal places) but does not achieve
statistical significance. This somewhat contradicts Hy
pothesis 1, which predicts that actors would be less
likely to refrain from attacking their allies after El Chapo’s
5
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Table 1. Results of four stochastic actor oriented models

Each model corresponds to one of the hypotheses. Standard errors are in
parentheses.

Figure 3: Change in the mean relative importance for network effects between the pre-arrest and
post-arrest periods. Out-degree Jaccard similarity is an indicator for alliances. Arrowheads
indicate the direction of change and numbers show quantities of change. Statistically significant
effects, per a Wald test with p < 0.05, are red.
6

CONNECTIONS

arrest. If that were the case, we would see a statistically
significant change in the positive direction for the effect
of Jaccard similarity on tie formation. To the contrary,
one might argue that cartels and militias have strong
incentives to form alliances. With the power vacuum
left by El Chapo’s arrest, cartels have more to gain from
forming alliances because doing so increases their
ability to wrestle control of drug smuggling routes from
rivals. Militias also have an incentive to form alliances
because they can pool personnel, resources, and
intelligence to combat increasing cartel violence. In this
case, we would see a statistically significant negative
change in the effect of Jaccard similarity on tie formation
probability. However, the lack of a positive or negative
statistically significant effect implies that the decisionmaking of cartels does not adhere to either of these
logics. Instead, they may have neither greatly expanded
or backed out of their alliances because, as Christia
(2012) has shown to be the case with insurgent groups,
organizations aim to create alliances large enough to
achieve their objectives while maximizing individual
payoffs. Another possible explanation is that alliances
between cartels formed more informally around the
sharing of knowledge and resources among lower-level

leaders. If this is the case, it would also explain why
changes to upper echelon leadership seemed to have
little effect on alliance formation or maintenance.

Reputational mechanisms
Figure 4 presents the results for general preferential
attachment and the preferential attachment of
aggressive organizations to form conflict ties with
those already under attack. In the first of these
models, in-degree popularity has a large effect but
is not statistically significant. In the second model,
the effect of out-in-degree assortativity is large and
statistically significant. This means more aggressive
cartels preferentially attack cartels and militias
that have already been under attack, probably to
consolidate their power. With a power vacuum left
after El Chapo’s arrest, more aggressive cartels
probably view cartels that are frequently attacked
as easy competition to eliminate. Yet some of the
increase in the mean relative importance of out-indegree assortativity might also be attributable to the
growing number of militias after El Chapo’s detention,
which more aggressive cartels might direct violence

Figure 4: Change in the mean relative importance of network effects between the pre and
post-arrest periods. In-degree popularity reflects preferential attachment while out-in-degree
assortativity is indicative of aggressive organizations preying on less aggressive rivals.
Arrowheads show the direction and numbers show quantities of change. Statistically significant
effects are red.
7
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against. Conversely, cartels and militias with lower
in-degree centralities were less likely to be attacked
after El Chapo’s arrest than before, suggesting those
organizations are more bellicose and would not be
perceived as easy targets.
Another interpretation is that very aggressive
organizations are more involved in in-fighting as both
initiators and victims of attacks. Put differently, cartels
that are heavily involved in in-fighting and initiate
many attacks against their rivals are probably on the
receiving end of more attacks due to their involvement
in in-fighting. Then, they probably reciprocate violence
against the initiators so they are not viewed as easy
targets. Accordingly, the large and statistically sig
nificant effect of reciprocity implies that retaliation
against organizations highly involved as both initiators
and victims of attacks is more likely to be carried out
by the victims of those organizations than by a different
cartel or militia. As in the previous interpretation, this
suggests that cartels and militias on the receiving end
of attacks are quick to reciprocate violence to prove
that they are not easy targets.

Transitive closure
Figure 5 shows the results for transitive closure. A
negative change in the mean relative importance of
this effect would indicate an avoidance of cartels to
engage in in-fighting. For example, if a cartel attacked

a second cartel and the second cartel attacked a third
cartel, the third cartel would not attack the first. On the
other hand, increased transitive closure would suggest
that in-fighting ties are more likely to form around
common social foci, as predicted by Feld (1981).
Though Feld’s theory predicts that ties in a friendship
or similar context will form around a social focus such
as club membership, increased transitive closure in
Mexico’s drug trade would imply that conflict ties are
more likely to form around the shared focus of drug
trafficking in contested areas. If that were the case,
it would indicate that cartels are uncertain about the
balance of power in a given area, which fighting would
reveal. However, the effect of transitive closure is not
statistically significant and only marginally contributes
to the decisions of cartels and militias. This indicates
that El Chapo’s arrest did not lead to uncertainty, or
at least not enough to significantly increase transitive
closure, around contested territories. Moreover, the
lack of a statistically significant increase for transitive
closure means the Sinaloa Cartel’s rivals did not greatly
change the perceived balance of power. Finally, it is
worth mentioning that the lack of uncertainty about the
balance of power is likely due in part to the reputational
mechanism described above. Cartels with higher indegrees would be perceived as weak and those with
low in-degrees would be perceived as strong, so there
would be no need for them to form transitive closure
around contested areas to reveal the balance of power.

Figure 5: Change in the mean relative importance for network effects before and after El Chapo’s
arrest. Transitive closure approximates clustering. Direction of changes is represented by
arrowheads and effect size is given by numbers above each line segment. Statistically significant
effects are shown in red.
8
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Discussion and conclusions
In this article I investigated the change in cartels’ and
militias’ decisions to engage in infighting before and
after the arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzman Loera,
the leader of Mexico’s most powerful drug cartel, in
2016. The three main insights from this analysis are (1)
alliances had virtually no effect on cartels’ and militias’
decisions to fight one another; (2) after El Chapo’s
arrest, cartels and militias faced greater reputational
costs for appearing weak, and;(3) El Chapo’s arrest
did not greatly affect certainty about territorial control
and relative power of other cartels. These findings are
important because they illuminate the dynamics of
inter-group violence that can occur when governments
pursue leadership decapitation to reduce violence.
Still, governments may have reason to be optimistic
because greater infighting might lead powerful armed
actors to neutralize weak rivals thereby decreasing
the number of actors governments must neutralize.
Though the results of this study show that to not be
the case after El Chapo’s detention, it might be the
case with other types of armed actors and in different
political and economic contexts. Accordingly, a fruitful
direction for future studies would be to use crossnational data on leadership decapitation to examine
the potential for leadership decapitation to facilitate the
elimination of weak armed actors by stronger rivals.
One potential concern with these findings is the
lack of a variable for territorial control. Of the four
independent variables of interest, only out-in-degree
assortativity, achieved statistical significance. If the
effect for out-in-degree assortativity is biased, we
would expect to see a statistically significant change
in transitive closure, because territorial control is a
focus around which cartels and militia would cluster
(Feld, 1981). Furthermore, coding territorial control
would be highly subjective because different cartels
control different territories at different times (Dulin and
Patiño, 2020).
Critics may also be skeptical because, despite
having achieved acceptable levels of convergence,
the simulated networks in the SAOM might not closely
align with the observed networks. Under normal
circumstances the goodness of fit of the models
could be tested using the Mahalanobis distance test
recommended in (Lospinoso and Snijders, 2019),
but this test is not appropriate when the number
of actors changes between periods (Ripley et al.,
2021). Therefore, some skepticism is warranted, but it
should also be noted that these findings are generally
congruent with the literature on leadership decapitation.
Some might also question the external validity of
these findings. One could make the case that these

findings do not apply to terrorist or insurgent groups,
which the majority of research in the literature review
focus on. However, the distinction between criminal
and terrorist organizations is not black and white. Some
insurgent organizations (e.g., the Taliban, Abu Sayyaf,
the Shining Path) are heavily invested in drug trafficking
and other criminal activities. Conversely, Mexican cartels
behave similarly to many of the insurgent organizations
cited in the literature. They recruit civilians to fight against
the state and their rivals, provision social services,
exercise judicial functions, and they are present in all
levels of politics, leading to the term narcoterrorism.
Still, every illegal armed organization exists in a different
context and I cannot rule out other actions of the
Mexican government other than El Chapo’s arrest as
having effected in-fighting. Therefore, I make no claim
that these findings will apply to any other specific case
and leave it to the reader to determine the applicability
of these results to other contexts.
This analysis extends previous work on the effect
of leadership decapitation by linking it with temporal
network dynamics. In addition, it adds to a burgeoning
body of literature that bridges the divide between
political science and sociology by applying network
analytic methods to questions related to intrastate
violence (Gade et al., 2019; Larson and Lewis, 2018;
Moore, 2019). Without network analytic methods,
many questions treated in the literature on substate
conflict would be impossible to answer. Likewise,
without consulting the political science literature on
alliances and rivalries, any network analysis of the
dependence of armed actors would probably be
ill-conceived because modeling assumptions and
coding decisions would not be realistic. Thus, given
the impact of government strategies against nonstate armed actors, applying social network analysis
to this class of problems should be of great interest to
both political scientists and network analysts.
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CONNECTIONS

Appendix A
Here I briefly describe the method I used to derive the
roles associated with cartels and militias. As Borgatti
and Grosser (2015) have explained, structurally equi
valent nodes, or those that have similar connection
profiles, have similar beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.
Stated differently, structurally equivalent nodes have
similar roles. To assign cartels and militias in the network
to roles, I use a generalized blockmodel proposed by
Žiberna (2007). The model attempts to partition nodes
into a given number of blocks in which the value of
each nodes’ ties with the rest of the block exceeds a
value m optimized by the algorithm. To determine the
difference between the partitions created by the model
and what an ideal partition should be, I use the sum
of squared errors between each block and a block
of the same size in which all values are greater than

or equal to the parameter m. Then, I take the mean
of the error over all of the 10 iterations I conducted
for each blockmodel with k equivalence groups. To
determine the ideal number of equivalence groups, I
estimate blockmodels with values of k ranging from
two to ten. Using only this range of values for k may
only converge to a local minimum, but as the number
of equivalence groups increase towards the number of
nodes in the network, the mean error would be biased
by the decreasing size of each equivalence group. To
find the optimal number of groups within this domain,
I create a plot where the x-axis represents the number
of equivalence groups and the y-axis is the mean of
the errors for all of the runs of the blockmodel with k
equivalence groups. From this plot, shown below, I
identify the number of equivalence groups at which the
rate of the decrease in the mean error levels off. That
point represents seven structural equivalence groups.

Figure A1: Structural equivalence group solutions. Numbers on the x-axis are the number of
structural equivalence groups and the y-axis represents the mean of the error between fitted
structural equivalence groups and the ideal structural equivalence groups across ten
simulations.
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